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Abstract
In this paper I set out conditions under which a tax on capital in°ows can be the optimal
policy for a government to implement. In particular, market incompleteness, in the form of
collateral constraints on domestic ¯nancial intermediation, can imply a positive measure of bor-
rowing constrained agents in that market. When the measure of borrowing-constrained agents
is su±ciently large, a capital in°ow tax combined with a lump-sum transfer can increase aggre-
gate social welfare. The intuition is simple: constrained agents do not adjust their consumption
behaviour in response to small changes in intertemporal prices (e.g. interest rates) but strictly
bene¯t from lump-sum transfers. When the measure of such agents is su±cient large, a tax and
transfer scheme can thus raise aggregate social welfare. Also, I ¯nd evidence that the welfare
gains to international capital markets are higher than the complete market model estimates of
Lucas (1987) and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). In particular, open international cap-
ital markets can raise steady-state social welfare in the order of 2.5 percent when collateral
constraints to borrowing exist.
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11 Introduction
The role of capital account restrictions on the social welfare of developing countries has come under
scrutiny. In part, the scrutiny is a natural reaction to complaints that capital account liberalizations
may have fanned the ¯res which led to the crises in many emerging markets towards the end of the
1990's. Other commentators appear to hold the opposite view, that capital account liberalizations
were not proceeding quickly enough and that unhindered capital °ows are essential to impose
\market discipline" (see Forbes [16]) on otherwise susceptible markets. The goal of this paper is
to examine the role of incomplete domestic credit markets on the welfare consequences of capital
account restrictions.
In this paper, I propose a two-country, single-good model where individual agents borrow and
lend with a domestic intermediary, the bank. The bank enforces borrowing contracts through
collateral claims. That is, agents are required to post a su±cient amount of collateral to secure
loans. Agents face a stochastic shock to their income which is private information and which renders
state-contingent pricing infeasible. Hence, the bank operates as a credit market, buying and selling
single-period uncontingent bonds.
International lending and borrowing in the model occurs through the banks and is secured by
the government in both countries. In addition, the government can impose a per-unit tax on capital
in°ows. That only capital in°ows may be taxed is assumed for two reasons. First, it simpli¯es the
game-theoretic analysis of the model and second, it seems reasonable to consider capital account
restrictions for those economies which typically impose them, namely developing countries with
capital in°ows. Finally, the usual Welfare Theorems do not hold in the current model and as such
the government is not a social planner although it does act to maximize social welfare.
The main ¯nding of the paper is that taxes on capital in°ows which are remitted in a lump-sum
fashion can be welfare-improving if a su±cient fraction of borrowers are collateral (or borrowing)
constrained. The intuition is straightforward. Although a tax on capital in°ows raises the cost of
borrowing, constrained agents do not adjust their consumption decisions and hence strictly bene¯t
as a result of the lump-sum transfer. If a su±ciently large measure of agents is constrained, then
the welfare gains to the constrained agents (and lenders) can be large enough to outweigh the costs
to other borrowers.
2The literature on incomplete markets and international ¯nance is extensive. Much of the lit-
erature focusses on international business cycles and cross-country correlations of consumption,
investment and employment. Much of the motivation can be traced to Backus, Kehoe and Kyd-
land [4] who develop a two-country complete-markets business cycle model and demonstrate that
the model is unable to generate plausible cross-country correlations of output and consumption
(among other statistics). While they do not address capital taxation problem directly, the results
of their model are generally assumed to indicate the presence of market frictions. Baxter and
Crucini [5], Stockman and Tesar [29], Kollmann [23], Heathcote and Perri [18] and Kehoe and
Perri [19] extend the standard two-country model to examine incomplete markets. The results
from the literature generally suggest that the presence of incomplete markets can generate corre-
lations that are closer to those observed in the data. Speci¯cally, [18] ¯nd that ¯nancial autarky,
in which all international trade must be quid pro quo, tends to approximate observed data bet-
ter than uncontingent bond or complete market models. In addition, [19] ¯nd that endogenous
borrowing constraints can similarly explain observed employment-investment correlations. None of
these papers examines explicitly the role, or consequences, of capital account restrictions.
There is also a burgeoning literature on endogenous borrowing constraints, both applied at the
individual level and to international markets. Lacker [25] constructs a two-period model where
output is only observable to the borrower and demonstrates that, when the borrower values col-
lateral more than the lender, collateral ensures repayment. Kocherlakota [23] demonstrates that
collateralized debt contracts are optimal in models where the ex-post value of collateral and the
ex-post investment return are known only to the borrower. Geanakoplos and Zame [17] construct
a two-period general equilibrium model where agents can default at any time and show that ¯-
nancial assets are only traded when backed by collateral. Andolafatto and Nosal [3] construct a
model where agents endogenously circulate claims which are implicitly backed by collateral. Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Shubik [11] construct a model of default and punishment in general equilibrium
where separating equilibria can exist contingent on disutility from default. The current paper
demonstrates that collateral is an endogenous borrowing constraint which restricts the amount of
intermediation somewhat like endogenous solvency constraints. That is, the amount an agent may
borrow is limited by the assets she may post as collateral. In this respect, the present paper is
related to Kehoe and Levine [21] and Alvarez and Jermann [2] who study the e®ects of solvency
3constraints. One key di®erence of this paper from [21] and [2] is that I do not assume that agents
determine borrowing constraints to ensure that repayment is individually rational for the borrower.
Finally, there is a literature on capital account restrictions and taxation. Eichengreen [14]
surveys the literature and ¯nds mixed support both theoretically and empirically, for capital account
liberalization. In part, capital account liberalization can be costly because of its apparent links
to the `hot-money' out°ows. Theoretical research on capital out°ows restrictions has tended to
focus on the role of restrictions in ine±ciently allocating capital. As such, the non-optimality of
restrictions usually follows from traditional competitive market and welfare theorems. Lab¶ an and
Larra¶ in [24] show that removing capital out°ow restrictions initiates increases in capital in°ows.
Bartolini and Drazen [6] extend this literature to consider the signalling aspects of initiating/lifting
capital controls. Finally, Lucas [26] and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [4] show that there is little
welfare gain to smoothing consumption international in complete markets models, an implication
of which is that capital controls have (relatively) minor consequences on welfare. This paper
purposefully abstracts from modeling capital account crises and as such does not address the
question of the desirability of large changes to capital in°ows. In addition, this paper ¯nds that the
presence of incomplete domestic credit markets implies a large welfare gains and cost to international
capital markets than those found by [26] and [4].
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment. Section 3
discusses the structure of the banking sector. Section 4 de¯nes international capital °ows and the
international capital market clearing condition. Section 5 describes the role and objective of the
government. Section 7 de¯nes an individual agents' problem and Section ?? lays out the timing of
the model. Section 9 de¯nes the model equilibrium and, in particular, demonstrates that taxing
capital in°ows can be the optimal policy for a government. Section 10 presents results from model
simulations which demonstrate that capital controls can be optimal for a utilitarian social-welfare
maximizing government [Not quite yet]. Section 11 concludes [To come].
2 Model Environment
There are two countries, Country 1 and Country 2. Agents in each country are di®erentiated by a
shock in their production function. Apart from the shock, the production technology is identical
4across all agents. In each Country j = 1;2 there exist a continuum of agents whose measures are
normalized to 1 and M respectively.1
Each agent in country j is initially endowed with ki
j;0 units of the country-speci¯c capital stock






j;t is the output of the consumption good by agent i in country j in period t, ki
j;t is
the capital stock used in production by agent i in country j in period t, ®j 2 (0;1) re°ects the
productivity of capital in the production function and ´i
j;t 2 Nj = f´j;´
jg; ´j > 1 > ´
j, is a
mean zero, idiosyncratic, stochastic shock to agent i in period t. Capital is assumed to depreciate
by a fraction ±j 2 [0;1) each period. I assume that agents cannot produce in the foreign country.
The shock for agents in country j, ´i





j;t = ´j) > 0 for ´j;´0
j 2 N. The shock is intended to capture
idiosyncratic elements of production, such as: drought, illness, median age, median experience,
time constraints, etc.2 The shock is assumed to be private information and to be revealed to agents
once production has occurred.










j´j;t;¼j] j = 1;2 (2)
where ci
j;t is consumption at time t by agent i in country j, ¯j is a time invariant discount factor
for agents in country j and °j is a constant parameter of relative risk aversion for agents in country
j. °j ´ 1
!j where !j measures an agent in country j's willingness to smooth consumption through
time.
3 Banking
The idiosyncratic shock implies that intertemporal risk-sharing within countries can be Pareto-
improving; hence contracting between agents is advantageous. The assumptions speci¯ed in this
1The model is qualitatively similar to the one-country model with endogenous collateral constraints developed in
Dunbar (2004).
2Clearly, in an in¯nite horizon model, age and experience are identical across agents. However, in¯nite horizon
agents may be considered also as dynastic households. Thus, the shock process also can be thought to represent the
proportion of productive members of the household at any given point in time.
5section are su±cient for collateralized lending and borrowing contracts to arise endogenously.3
Assumption 1 An agent's shock, ´j;t, is private information and output can be privately con-
sumed.
Assumption 2 Capital stock holdings, ki
j;t, are common knowledge to the bank (or costlessly
veri¯able).
Assumption 3 Contracts which specify a transfer, bi
j;t, from (to) an agent i at a price ai
j;t¡1bi
j;t
in period t ¡ 1 may be written costlessly. Contracts are assumed to be common knowledge
and contracts may be breached.
Assumption 4 Agents may contract once per period through an intermediary in their country
(henceforth referred to as the bank). There is assumed to be free-entry to banking.
Assumption 1 implies that agents cannot be di®erentiated by the bank by observation. In particular,
agents with a high shock may consume their additional output without public observation and, more
importantly, that the optimal consumption sequence for agent i, fci
j;tg1
t=1, in any time period t is
private information. Hence, the bank cannot infer the output or desired consumption sequence of
any agent given the assumption of an in¯nity of agents. Assumption 3 characterizes the nature
of the bargaining problem. In particular, Assumption 3 states that only one-period uncontingent
bonds are traded. Assumption 4 rules out some contracting equilibria in that each agent can only
bargain once per period.
Since Assumption 3 speci¯es that contracts may be breached, then any contracts must have an
implicit or explicit enforcement technology to ensure that those contracts are repaid. The following
enforcement technologies are assumed to be possible for a bank to o®er:
Censure A bank may refuse to intermediate with a censured agent for a speci¯ed period of time,
º = 1;
Garnishment A bank may garnish a speci¯c amount m of an agent's output in the period subse-
quent to default for a ¯xed cost, g;
3See Dunbar(2004) for a further discussion of environments where collateralized contracts can arise endogenously.
6Collateral A bank may require collateral, q for a loan and may seize collateral costlessly upon
default. Banks may disburse received collateral costlessly within the country it is seized.
Banks cannot exchange capital internationally.
In addition, banks face a solvency constraint such that a bank cannot su®er a loss in any period.
Since free-entry implies that banks cannot make positive expected pro¯ts in any period, then the
solvency constraint implies that banks make zero pro¯t in every period. The solvency constraint
implicitly embeds an opportunity cost of zero to entry. That is, unless a bank can earn at least


















where µj;t is the pro¯t of a bank in country j in period t, ai
j;t+1 is the price of a period t+1 bond in
period t to agent i and ei
j;t is the net amount collected using the enforcement technology from agent
i in period t contingent on default by agent i. It is important to note that the bank's pro¯t function
(3) includes the possibility of only one bank which operates in both countries. Thus, one could
imagine a single international bank rather than independent, national, banks. Finally, I assume
that banks are pro¯t-maximizers.
The banks' problem then is to maximize their °ow of pro¯ts, (3), subject to the choice of an
enforcement technology.
3.1 Interest Rates and Bank Pro¯t
The following proposition demonstrates that the price of the risk-free bonds is the same for all
agents for a bond in country j. Intuitively, since the risk-free bond is the same instrument o®ered
to all agents then the price of the bond, assuming market-clearing, must be the same for all agents.
Proposition 3.1.1 ai
j;t = aj;t 8i; j = 1;2.
Proof: Given the environment, a bank could write contracts which are contingent on an agent's




j;t) is some pricing kernel. However, in equilibrium, it must be that ai
j;t = aj;t, 8i. To see this,
7let ^ a represent the price charged to an agent who borrows and ~ a represent the price o®ered to an
agent who lends.
1. Suppose ^ ai
t < ~ ah
t , Then an entrant bank can o®er contracts ^ ai
j;t + ^ ²i and ~ ah
j;t + ~ ²h, ~ ²h < 0 < ^ ²i
which both agent i and agent h prefer. That is, if ^ ai
j;t < ~ ah
j;t < 1 then the cost of borrowing
for agent i is lower and the return for agent h is higher. If 1 < ^ ai
j;t < ~ ah
j;t then the return
to borrowing for agent i is higher and the cost of lending for agent h is lower. Moreover, ^ ²i






j;t+1 = 0, i.e. such that market clearing is
una®ected. Hence ^ ai
j;t < ~ ah
j;t cannot be an equilibrium.
2. Suppose ^ ai
j;t > ~ ah
j;t. Then an entrant bank can o®er contracts ^ ai
j;t+^ ²i and ~ ah
j;t+~ ²h, ~ ²h < 0 < ^ ²i
which both agent i and agent h prefer. That is, the borrowing agent i receives more in period
t and the lending agent h is promised more in period t + 1. With free-entry and price-
competition, then the sequence of prices diverge such that: ^ ai
j;t ! 1 and ~ ah
j;t ! 0. It
is trivial that market clearing in period t cannot hold and hence a stationary equilibrium
cannot be sustained.
Hence ^ ai
j;t = ~ ah
j;t = ai
j;t 8i;t. To complete the proof consider the arguments of Rothschild and
Stiglitz [28]. If ai
j;t 6= ah
j;t for agents i and h then by the arguments above there exists an pro¯table
deviation contract for a bank where agent i is a borrower and agent h is a lender (or vice versa).
Hence ai
j;t 6= ah
j;t cannot be an equilibrium. Thus the only equilibrium can be a pooling equilib-
rium where ai
j;t = ah
j;t = aj;t since there is no pro¯table deviation for a bank (any deviation by
construction would entail a loss). ¥.

















The possibility of a single international bank entering both national banking sectors drives the
structure of the banking sector. Country-speci¯c idiosyncratic shocks provide a motive for inter-
national borrowing and lending but the possibility of an international bank enforces international
bond market clearing. Suppose, for instance, that the banking sectors operated independently.
8Then each bank's pro¯t would be:












j;t; j = 1;2: (5)
As long as a1;t+1 6= a2;t+1 an international entrant could o®er a pro¯table deviation. Suppose
a1;t+1 < a2;t+1 · 1. Then an international entrant could o®er to borrow bonds from Country 2
at a price a2;t+1 ¡ ²2, ²2 ! 0, and lend bonds to Country 1 at a price a1;t+1 + ²1, where ²2 > ²1,
such that the entrant makes a pro¯t. Similar analysis holds when a1;t+1 > a2;t+1 ¸ 1. Hence, the
possible entry of an international entrant forces the world bond market to clear and, in particular,
that aj;t = at; 8j.
3.2 Equilibrium Enforcement Mechanism
Although the bank can choose among the feasible enforcement mechanism, in equilibrium banks
will choose to enforce contracts using collateral requirements. Free-entry implies that, whichever
enforcement mechanism chosen, the bank cannot expect to earn pro¯ts from the enforcement mech-
anism. The solvency constraint implies that banks will choose an enforcement mechanism which
does not earn negative pro¯ts. The following proposition demonstrates that collateral emerges as
the equilibrium enforcement mechanism.4
Proposition 3.2.1 In equilibrium, banks choose collateral as the enforcement mechanism for con-
tracts
Proof: It is immediate that, in equilibrium, banks will not choose censure as the enforcement
mechanism for contracts since they cannot enforce the cost of censure to individual agents. With
free-entry into banking and the opportunity to o®er a competing contract, autarky is not the
relevant punishment scheme since an entrant bank could o®er either collateral or garnishment
contracts without any loss of pro¯ts. Hence, the value of the outside option of an agent is always
(weakly) greater than autarky and, as a result, the optimal strategy of a borrower is to borrow the
maximum amount allowed under censure and then default. The continuation payo® is thus (weakly)
greater than that of continuing under censure. Since default implies negative pro¯ts, which banks
4See Dunbar (2004) for a further discussion on the emergence of collateral contracts in a model with assymmetric
information.
9cannot support, censure contracts cannot be an equilibrium when either collateral or garnishment
are feasible enforcement mechanisms.5
Both garnishment and collateral enforcement mechanisms are feasible for a bank in the sense
that they can recoup losses su®ered through default. However, given the speci¯cation of the pro-
duction function, any garnishment contract may be written equivalently as a collateral contract,
since there exists a one-to-one mapping between capital and output. However, the ¯xed cost of
garnishment implies a deadweight loss which is avoidable using collateral contracts. For instance,
given an incumbent bank o®ering garnishment contracts, an entrant bank could o®er exactly the
same contracts to agents using collateral as the enforcement mechanism and earn the deadweight
costs as pro¯t. Hence, no bank has an incentive to o®er garnishment contracts if collateral contracts
are feasible. ¥
Proposition 3.2.1 states that banks optimally choose to o®er collateral contracts. The next
proposition, Proposition 3.2.2, demonstrates that banks choose to o®er collateral contracts where
the value of collateral posted is equal to the face-value of the bond obligation.
Proposition 3.2.2 Banks set the collateral requirement, qi
j;t+1, for a loan, bi
j;t+1 to an agent i in
country j in period t such that qi
j;t+1 = bi
j;t+1.
Proof: Essentially, this is a Bertrand result. If the bank sets the collateral requirement higher
than the face value of the loan then a competing bank may enter and o®er a marginally lower collat-
eral requirement without any concommitent loss of pro¯ts (no agent would default if qi
t+1 > bi
t+1).
Since collateral constrains consumption smoothing, any relaxation of the collateral requirement will
attract all the agents to the new bank. In addition, no bank will set the amount of collateral lower
than the face value of the loan. To see this, consider the arguments of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28].
Suppose the bank solves the individual problem of both high shock and low shock agents with given
capital stocks, ki
t. The enforcement value of collateral to an agent is the expected future period,
t + 1, marginal value of capital to that agent. Suppose the bank sets the borrowing constraint
5I note that it is possible for a bank to write a censure contract where the outside option is not permanent autarky
but instead the continuation payo® of the competing mechanism. However, the general equilibrium consequences of
such contracts are unclear since the borrowing constraint must, by necessity, be zero for any agent who would prefer
to borrow, default and exercise the outside option. Moreover, no agent can be allowed to borrow to that level. Hence
the borrowing constraints are much tighter than simply Kehoe-Levine style contracts. In addition, the value of the
outside option is di±cult to specify since it depends on a and thus, by construction, on the measure of agents at a
given point in time. The exact solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
10for all agents with ki
t at the level of borrowing at which the agent with the highest future period
marginal value of capital is indi®erent. Call this agent the low type. By the arguments of [28]
this cannot be a pooling equilibrium since all high types would borrow to the level of the low type
and then default. Moreover, when a low type contract is o®ered, all high types have an incentive
to act as a low type. Thus, there can be no separating equilibrium. The only other option is a
pooling equilibrium where the borrowing constraint is set at the level of the high type. However,
by [28] this can not be a pooling equilibrium in a competitive market since there exists a pro¯table
deviation (contract) for a low type agent who has a higher future period marginal value of capital
(i.e. relaxing the borrowing constraint). Hence, only high type borrowing constraints cannot be
an equilibrium. Thus, the only equilibrium which exists is where qi
t+1 = bi
t+1. ¥
Finally, the solvency constraint and free-entry imply banks earn zero pro¯ts. Moreover, since
only risk-free bonds are traded then a direct implication is that all contracts are zero-pro¯t. The





















j;t = 0 is immediate since the collateral require-

















j;t+1) > 0 then the international bank can earn a pro¯t in period t which








j;t+1) = 0. ¥
4 International Lending and Borrowing
National banks are assumed to be able to borrow and lend internationally, in essence replicating the
structure of an international bank. International lending and borrowing between national banks is
assumed to be unsecured, in the sense that a bank cannot expropriate capital posted as collateral
across borders. In addition, garnishment mechanisms are also assumed to be infeasible, since banks
cannot forcibly seize foreign output. As a result, international lending and borrowing must be
enforced through other means.
11International borrowing and lending between banks necessarily implies a slackness in the feasible
sets of national intermediary contracts. Where bi
j;t+1 is the borrowing (lending) of an agent i at






in a equilibrium without international borrowing or lending. However, this need not be the case
with international borrowing and lending. Where at is the world price of a bond bi
j;t+1 by agent i









2;t+1 = 0: (6)




j;t+1 and net bond repayments,
P
i bi





















and the price of bonds is constant, at = a; 8t. Then, in a stationary equilibrium, there is an
equivalence between the world capital account clearing and world bond market clearing:
X
j












j = 0; (8)
which states that the world capital account must clear whenever the world bond market clears. It
is important to note that in any stationary equilibria then KAj < 0 implies an excess demand of
loans in the current period bond sales, i.e. at
P
i bi
j;t+1 < 0, whenever 0 < a < 1.
5 The Government
I assume that there exists a national authority, the government, in each country j which has
preferences over the aggregate social welfare in j. The government is assumed to have preferences








12where Wj;t is the utility of the government in country j in period t, ³i
j is the weight the government
in country j assigns to agent(s) i and ¹i
j;t is the measure of agents of type i in country j in period t.
For the model considered in this paper, I assume that the government weights each agent equally
so that ³i
j = 1. Although the government cannot observe each agents' utility, Ui
j;t, since the shock
is private information, I assume that a law of large numbers applies such that the government can
determine Wj;t to an arbitrarily close degree.
The government can restrict or tax any agent or bank who borrows or lends internationally.
It is this assumption that permits foreign exchange. The government has an incentive to allow
international lending and borrowing since the world bond market constraint implies greater risk-
sharing and thus higher welfare. The government in Country i can enforce bank repayment of
any international obligations by threatening to bar any bank, or even all agents from a country,
which has reneged on a past debt. Essentially, the government can impose a Kehoe-Levine type
punishment by instituting international autarky for any defaulting bank which creates a wedge for
an international entrant. Moreover, the government faces no ex-post incentive to renegotiate since
it can allow future intermediation with an international entrant. Thus, a bank which has defaulted
on debt repayment faces insolvency since an international entrant could use capital in°ows to o®er
contracts which are strictly preferred by domestic agents. Moreover, no government would want a
purely national bank to operate (even one that had previously defaulted and temporarily enriched
its citizens) since international intermediation is welfare improving. Hence, international default
ensures insolvency for the o®ending bank since both governments then have an incentive to allow
an international bank to enter. Finally, I assume the government cannot arbitrarily seize any
repayment °ows. That is, a government cannot force a bank to become bankrupt by forcing it to
default on any bond repayments.
The government in country j has complete control over the °ow of goods across its border and
can impose a per-unit tax, Áj;t, on capital account in°ows, at
P
i bi
j;t+1 < 0 or
P
i bi
t > 0.6 The level
of Áj;t is assumed to be freely observable to all agents in either economy. Any revenues obtained
from the imposition of Áj;t are assumed to be distributed in a lump-sum fashion to all agents in
6I consider only taxes on capital account in°ows for two reasons. The ¯rst reason is that it is more tractable in
the context of the current model to tax only one °ow since only one-period bonds are traded. Taxing both in°ows
and out°ows would essentially double tax the same instrument. Secondly, taxes on capital in°ows match the Chilean
experience and are, at present, cautiously supported by the IMF according to Stanley Fischer [15], the former First
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF.
13country j. That is, all agents receive an amount Tj;t from the government. In equilibrium, the
government in country j chooses the level of Áj;t to maximize the social welfare in country j. The


























j s:t: (10) (11)
Finally, it is worth noting that I assume the government does not have taxation authority in the
traditional sense. Since output is both private information and privately consumable, the govern-
ment would not be able to tax consumable income without some type of enforcement mechanism.
I abstract from these considerations and hence domestic income or capital taxes and any redis-
tributive impacts they might have. One direct consequence for capital account taxation is that
governments are restricted to positive tax levels, that is, they cannot o®er subsidies.
6 Taxation and International Capital Flows
Without loss of generality, let
P
i bi
2;t+1 > 0 >
P
i bi
1;t+1 which implies Country 1 has a net in°ow
from the sales of period t + 1 bonds and Country 2 has a net out°ow from the sales of period
t + 1 bonds. The imposition of a tax on capital in°ows, Áj;t > 0 distorts the world capital account

























2;t+1 = 0: (12)
A tax on capital in°ows, Á1;t > 0, which is imposed by Country 1 would, in the absence of
bond price changes, cause the world capital account to be in de¯cit. To see this, note that the
world capital account clearing condition, (12), implies that an increase in Á1 would reduce the net
in°ow in Country 1. As a result, the net world capital account out°ows must be greater than the
net in°ows and hence the world capital account must be negative. Moreover, world bond market
14clearing for period t + 1 bonds, (6), would also be a®ected. Speci¯cally, the world bond market








2;t+1 = 0 (13)
which implies that the imposition of the tax reduces the net in°ow to the bank(s) in Country 1,
ceteris paribus. Hence, the world bond price must adjust. An increase in the world bond price,
at, increases the borrowing of Country 1, i.e. ¡at(1 ¡ Á1;t)
P
i bi
1;t+1 increases. At the same time,
an increase in at reduces the incentives to lending which reduces ¡at
P
i bi
2;t+1. Hence, an increase
in at returns the economy to equilibrium. It is important to note that while the world bond price
must increase, the borrowing costs in Country 1 will actually rise as a result of the tax. That is,
the tax acts as a wedge between the bond prices in Country 1 and Country 2. Let ^ at = (1¡Á1;t)at
be the tax-adjusted bond price in Country 1.
Conversely, world capital account clearing, (12), imposes a time-inconsistency problem for a tax
on capital in°ows, Á2;t > 0. Consider a tax which is announced and imposed in the same period.
The imposition of a tax on capital in°ows by Country 2 in period t distorts the world bond market









2;t = 0: (14)
However, by construction, the bond market, (6), must have cleared in period t¡1 when the period
t bonds were traded. Hence, the imposition of Á2;t > 0 causes the net repayments from Country
1 to the bank(s) in Country 2 to fall short of its (their) net obligations. That is, the bank(s) in
Country 2 will not receive su±cient after-tax repayments to pay o® their bond obligations. Hence,
the announcement and imposition of a tax in the same period must necessarily imply the insolvency
of the bank(s) in Country 2. Next, consider the announcement of a tax in period t ¡ 1 which will
be imposed in period t. Hence, in period t, the after-tax bond market clearing condition (14), must

















2;t < 0 (15)
which cannot be an equilibrium.
157 Agent's Problem




















j;t = f0;1g (18)
where:
Table 1: Parameter De¯nitions
Parameter De¯nition
ci
j;t consumption by agent i in period t
ki
j;t+1 capital stock of agent i in period t
± 2 [0;1] depreciation rate on capital
bi
j;t+1 bond savings at time t by agent i
aj;t the price of a bond at time t
bi
j;t+1 the endogenous collateral constraint on borrowing
¿i
j;t = 0 agent i defaults in period t
¿i
j;t = 1 agent i does not default in period t
qi
j;t collateral demanded for a loan bi
j;t
Tj lump sum transfer from the government
Under default agents are assumed to forgo repayment of a debt bi
j;t and forfeit their collateral.
Hence the remaining capital stock of agent i after default is simply the di®erence between the
capital stock at the beginning of the period and the amount claimed by the bank.7
Given that at, qi
j;t and Áj;t are taken as exogenous by the agent in country j, the agent's problem
can be written recursively in a stationary setting. Let ¡i
j;t represent the set of feasible choices for
agent i in country j at time t. That is, ¡i




j;t) vectors such that
equations (16) - (18) are satis¯ed.
The agent's problem can be formulated as a dynamic program. Formally, given the state
7Default in the model is a binary choice variable. That is, agents cannot default on a fraction of their debt.
This assumption is by construction restrictive but it serves the purpose of restricting renegotiation. However, the
assumption of a binary choice over default seems justi¯ed since only one-period debt contracts are considered. Were
this model extended to include multiple-period debt, then it would seem plausible to allow agents to default on their

















The choice over future period states re°ects the future e®ects of default. S0 denotes the next period
state. Finally, ¹(Si) refers to the measure of agents in state (Si).
8 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows. In each period, the following sequence of events occurs:
1. The government j reveals (chooses) the tax rate Áj.
2. Agents produce using their available capital stocks.
3. Agents learn their shock and receive their output.
4. Agents settle their previous-period contracts, if such contracts exists and agents contract (or
not) with the bank.
5. Banks exchange one-period payments and ful¯ll obligations.
6. Agents choose next-period capital holdings and consume.
7. Depreciation occurs.
The nature of the timing is not innocuous. In particular, the timing rules out a potential hold-up
problem on the part of the lender. Second, the nature of the timing implies that depreciation a®ects
the lender and the borrower in the same manner.8
9 Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the equilibrium of the model. In particular, I examine the three sectors
of the model; banks, the government and agents, and de¯ne the economy-wide equilibrium. In
addition, I demonstrate that taxing capital in°ows can be an optimal policy for the government.
8The timing of the depreciation also simpli¯es the computational analysis in later sections. The di±cultly with
depreciation immediately following production is that it implies that lenders must discount collateral twice before
they can consume it while borrowers only discount collateral once. For this reason, I assume that depreciation occurs
at the end (or equivalently the beginning) of a period so that borrowers and lenders have the same discount period
over collateral.
179.1 Equilibrium De¯nition
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in the model is de¯ned as follows for j = 1;2:
A set of functions, Vj(Si), bj(Si), kj(Si), cj(Si), yj(Si), ¿j(Si), ¹j(Si), a tax rate Áj and a bond
price a, such that given °j, ¯j, ±j, ®j, ´j and ¼j(´0j´):
1. The government in country j chooses Áj subject to Equations (11) and (10).
2. Given Áj, a is given by the world bond market clearing condition, equations (12) and (13).
3. Given Áj and a, agent i in country j chooses bj(Si);kj(Si);cj(Si);¿j(Si) to maximize her
dynamic problem Vj(Si) given by equation (19).
4. The agent's output is given by (1).
5. Aggregates result from individual behavior, Kj =
P
i ¹j(Si)ki




6. There exists an invariant probability measure Pj de¯ned over the ergodic set of equilibrium
distributions in country j.
9.2 Equilibrium Collateral Default
The bank determines qi
t+1 such that the expected value of the collateral qi
t+1 is equal to the expected
value of the bond repayment, bi
t+1. This implicitly determines the endogenous borrowing constraint
for an agent i such that jbi
t+1j · (1 ¡ ±)(ki




t+1 < 0. Since no agent will
refuse (default on) the repayment of a bond, then qi
t+1 = 0 8 bi
t+1 ¸ 0.
The price of capital is trivially determined in the model. The agents' budget constraint (16)
implies that the price of capital is simply the numeraire price, 1, 8t. The bank is assumed to sell
o® the received collateral so that all agents receive an identical share as long as they have su±cient















9Alternative disbursement programs won't a®ect the aggregate amount of net investment and thus the sale format
has no impact on the equilibrium in this case.
18If received collateral is such that (20) is not satis¯ed then the total amount of collateral to
be sold is greater than the total amount of net investment and hence the price of capital must
adjust.The next proposition demonstrates that Equation (20) must hold by construction.
Proposition 9.2.1 In equilibrium, no agent defaults, i.e. ¿i = 1 8i when (20) holds.
Proof: Since the price of capital and the face value price of bonds are identical, then there is
no e®ect on an agent's current period budget constraint of exchanging capital for bonds. Hence,
no agent can be made better o® by defaulting when the price of capital is 1. In addition, agents
who face borrowing constraints are strictly better o® by having more capital and thus prefer to
pay o® their bond debts using current period income and, if need be, some of their capital stock.
By defaulting, they pay o® their bond debts using just their capital stocks which means that the
amount of capital available to collateralize loans would be less than if they used some current period
income. Hence, default will not arise in equilibrium. ¥.
9.3 Optimal Capital In°ow Taxation
The following proposition establishes the optimality of Áj > 0 for the government in country j.
Proposition 9.3.1 A necessary condition for Áj > 0 to be optimal for a government in country j
is that there exists a su±cient positive measure of borrowing-constrained agents.
Proof: A borrowing agent in period t can be identi¯ed by two characteristics: they enter
period t with insu±cient wealth holdings to self-smooth their preferred consumption sequence,
given at; and they expect to have a higher income (wealth) from which to borrow in period t + 1.
Hence, borrowers have relatively lower levels of wealth (in both capital and bonds) than lenders
and constrained borrowers have relatively the lowest levels of wealth. To see this last part, note
that a constrained borrower has debts which equal their collateralizable assets (capital) and hence
can only consume and invest out of current income. In fact, depreciation implies their consumption
must be strictly less than their income. No unconstrained borrower has as tight a period budget
constraint. Carroll and Kimball [9] demonstrate that the consumption function is concave in
wealth. De¯ne ^ bi
j;t+1 < 0 as the optimal unconstrained borrowing choice of agent j in period t
conditional on loans being repaid in period t + 1. Let ^ ¹j;t > 0 be the measure of agents for whom
19the constrained borrowing choice 0 > bi
j;t+1 > ^ bi
j;t+1. That is, ^ ¹j;t is the measure of agents who
cannot borrow to the extent that they would prefer. Next, I note that the government's budget
constraint, (10), implies that the revenues gained from the imposition of the tax must equal the
lump-sum transfer in aggregate. Since the tax is collected from bond repayments (^ at < at) and
the lump-sum transfer is paid to all agents, then the implication is that the median borrower pays
more in the tax than they receive from the transfer, so the tax in costly to most borrowers in a
welfare sense.















with inequality for any constrained borrowing agent. One implication of the agents' Euler equation
is that a constrained agent may not change her consumption behavior in response to a change in
at.
I am now in a position to prove the proposition. The Benveniste and Scheinkman formula and













Hence, the e®ect of the tax is unambiguously bene¯cial to lenders and small borrowers but costly
to most borrowers. However, for constrained borrowers
@ci
j;t+1
@a = 0 =
@V (Si)
@a and the tax is unam-















then a tax, Á1;t is welfare improving. Where ci
j;t is lowest for constrained agents then the concavity
of utility implies there exists a ^ ¹j;t such that a tax is optimal. ¥
20Corollary 9.3.2 If a tax on capital out°ows was permissible, then a tax, Á2;t > 0, and a lump-
sum transfer, T2;t > 0, would be welfare improving if there exists a su±cient measure of borrowing
agents.
Proof: The imposition of a tax, Á2;t > 0, on net bond out°ows from Country 2 can be welfare-
improving since the tax adjusted bond price in Country 2 must rise. Hence, the tax reduces the
borrowing costs while concurrently increasing the costs of lending. Moreover, the lump-sum transfer
T2;t < 0 implies a bene¯t for all agents. Hence, a tax, Á2;t > 0, would redistribute wealth from
lenders to borrowers and hence be welfare improving if the measure of borrowers is su±cient large.
However, since Country 2 is a net lender then the measure of borrowers may not be su±ciently
large. The presence of borrowing constrained agents does not improve the welfare-consideration
because unconstrained borrowers actually bene¯t the most. ¥
However, a tax on capital out°ows is not feasible for the government to impose. I note also that
Proposition 9.3.1 only requires that agents be borrowing constrained. It does not explicitly require
that agents are collateral constrained. That collateral constrains borrowing in the model emerges
from the model environment. However, alternative model environments where a positive measure
of agents face borrowing constraints could similarly bene¯t from taxes on capital in°ow combined
with lump-sum transfers.
10 Numerical Examples
In this section, I present preliminary evidence on the welfare bene¯ts of international intermediation
and the bene¯ts of capital in°ow taxation [the latter part to come]. The examples are meant
simply to provide some intuition as to the size of the welfare e®ects which are di±cult to determine
analytically.
The ¯rst example examines the impact of international capital °ows with countries which are
symmetric in terms of their size, M = 1, and the riskiness of the shock, N1 = N2 but which di®er in
the persistence of the shock, ¼j. The second example examines the impact of international capital
°ows when the countries di®er in size, M < 1 and persistence but where the riskiness of the shock
remains symmetric. Thus, example 1 is intended to provide intuition on the bene¯ts of capital
in°ow taxation on large open economies and example 2 is intended to provide intuition on the
21bene¯ts of capital in°ow taxation on small open economies. I note that the results presented are
steady-state comparisons although the conditions under which a tax is welfare-improving do not
hinge on stationarity. In particular, it is possible and indeed likely that the optimal welfare gains
over the transition to a steady-state might require a time-varying tax.
Also, it is not a priori clear how best to measure the welfare gains from international capital
markets. I present two measures. The ¯rst is a measure of the social welfare costs relative to the
social welfare of a complete markets model. That is, the welfare cost is expressed as a percentage
of the complete markets social welfare. The second measure reported, termed CV, is the lump-sum
transfer of consumption required to attain the social welfare of a complete markets model. Hence,
it is similar to a measure of compensating variation. It is important to note, however, that a lump-
sum transfer to all agents is di®erent from determining the lump-sum required to raise aggregate
consumption to the complete markets level because of the heterogeneity of consumption levels.
The following sections present the results of the numerical examples. In particular, the results
demonstrate that the welfare consequences of international capital markets can be substantial, in
the order of 2:5 per cent of steady-state consumption. In addition, the results show that the relative
sizes of the countries a®ects substantially the equilibrium world risk-free real interest rate. Figures
1-4 in the Appendix complement the quantitative results presented in the following sections.
10.1 Example 1
I set ¼1(´1j´1) = 0:9 and ¼2(´2j´2) = 0:5 for Country 1 and Country 2 respectively. That is, shocks
in Country 1 are more persistent than shocks in Country 2. The remaining parameters of the model









Table 2 compares the steady-state equilibria between the open-economy and closed economy
22cases for both Country 1 and Country 2. By construction, open capital markets equate the real
interest rate across countries. As should be expected, international capital °ows cause the gap
in the marginal product of capital across both countries to narrow. However, the gap does not
entirely disappear, owing to the incomplete nature of the domestic bond markets. Indeed, the
marginal product of capital in Country 1 actually increases slightly, indicating less capital over-
accumulation. The change in output, Y, in Country 2 is more sizeable than in Country 1 as
the fall in the marginal product of capital implies that the aggregate capital stock is increasing.
Aggregate output in Country 1 actually falls slightly, as the increase in the marginal product of
capital reduces steady-state capital. Finally, as one would expect, the increase in risk-sharing
resulting from international capital °ows increases steady-state consumption in both countries.
The increase is sharpest in Country 2 where virtually all agents bene¯t from reducing the volatility
of the random-walk shocks.
Table 2: Results
Country 1
Model Y C K B KF i ROE
Open Economy 2:0404 1:4020 5:7498 1:9135 0:6376 2:50% 3:13%
Closed Economy 2:0417 1:3999 5:7590 1:5494 0 2:50% 3:05%
Closed Economy Autarky 1:9987 1:3748 5:58 3:72%
Country 2
Model Y C K B KI i ROE
Open Economy 2:0348 1:3737 5:840 0:7057 ¡0:6336 2:50% 3:00%
Closed Economy 1:8857 1:3372 4:8554 1:3532 0 3:60% 4:43%
Closed Economy Autarky 1:861 1:3537 4:67 5:07%
Open Economy refers to the collateral model with free capital °ows; Closed Economy refers to the
collateral model with no international capital °ows; Closed Economy Autarky refers to the case with no
collateral trades and no international °ows; Y refers to aggregate equilibrium output; C refers to aggregate
equilibrium consumption; K is aggregate equilibrium capital stock; B is the face-value of all bonds traded;
KF is the capital in°ow (in°ow if negative); i is the interest rate on the risk free bond; and ROE refers to
the average expected return to capital;
Table 3 presents welfare comparisons of the open-economy and closed-economy models for both
Country 1 and Country 2. In both cases, welfare is higher in the open-economy equilibrium than in
the closed-economy equilibrium. Thus, the increase in steady-state aggregate consumption appears
to imply a social welfare gain. In Country 1, the welfare gain is predominantly among borrowers
who bene¯t from the lower cost of borrowing. In addition, there is a slight decrease in the measure
23of agents who are borrowing constrained which is strictly welfare improving. The indices of in-
equality suggest also that there is a slight decrease in inequality in Country 1 in the open-economy
equilibrium.
However, it is in Country 2 that the welfare gains appear more pronounced. The welfare gains
from international intermediation appear to halve the welfare costs associated with incomplete
markets. The welfare gains are associated with a roughly 50 percent decrease in the measure of
borrowing constrained agents, which suggests that international capital in°ows can have tangible
distributional consequences. The indices of inequality substantiate this point strongly, as both the
Gini and the Generalised Entropy measures show sharp reductions in inequality. Thus, the presence
of incomplete markets with collateral constraints appears to dramatically increase the welfare gains
to international capital markets relative to the complete markets comparisons of [4] and [26]. In
particular, the welfare gains are equivalent to roughly 2.5 per cent of steady-state consumption.
Table 3: Welfare Comparisons
Country 1
Model Social Welfare CV Gini GE Top 30 Constrained
Open Economy 5:73 0:0697 0:3940 0:1105 56:61 17:24
Closed Economy 6:03 0:0731 0:4054 0:1190 57:44 18:27
Country 2
Model Social Welfare CV Gini GE Top 30 Constrained
Open Economy 2:96 0:0389 0:1890 0:0265 43:00 5:92
Closed Economy 5:71 0:0731 0:3953 0:1100 59:28 10:00
Open Economy refers to the open-economy collateral model; Closed Economy refers to the closed-economy collateral model;
Social Welfare refers to the di®erence between either model and a closed-economy complete market model (i.e. a Social Planner)
where the number presented is the welfare cost is expressed as a percentage of the welfare in the closed-economy complete market
model; CV is the per-capita lump-sum transfer of consumption required to attain the social welfare of the closed-economy complete
market model; Gini refers to the Gini coe±cient on the distribution of wealth, where wealth is de¯ned as the sum of capital and
bonds held by an agent; GE refers to the Generalised Entropy Measure on wealth using a weighting parameter of 0; Top 30 refers to
the percentage of wealth held by the top 30 percent of agents; and Constrained refers to the percentage of agents who face a binding
borrowing constraint.
10.2 Example 2
Again, I set ¼1(´1j´1) = 0:9 and ¼2(´2j´2) = 0:5 for Country 1 and Country 2 respectively. That
is, shocks in Country 1 are more persistent than shocks in Country 2. The key di®erence is that I
assume Country 1 is large relative to Country 2. Speci¯cally, I set M = 0:1 so that the population
24of Country 1 is ten times larger than that of Country 2. The remaining parameters of the model









Table 4 compares the steady-state equilibria between the open-economy and closed economy
cases for both Country 1 and Country 2. Again, in the open economy model, output and consump-
tion are both higher than in the closed economy model. As well, the marginal products of capital in
both countries tend to converge. However, the striking result from Table 5 is that the risk-free real
interest rate is actually lower in the open economy model than the closed economy risk-free real
interest rate in either country. That is, the risk-free real interest rate does not converge to some
intermediate value as occurs in Example 1 above. The reason is that some lenders in Country 1 in
the closed economy model who desire to lend are constrained because of the collateral requirements
which prevent some borrowers from being able to borrow their optimal amount. However, with
international lending and borrowing, these lenders in Country 1 can circumvent the domestic credit
market and lend to agents in Country 2. Moreover, because the real interest rate at which these
lenders in Country 1 are willing to lend is at or below 2:50 per cent then there is downward pres-
sure on the real interest rate. Furthermore, a lower risk-free real interest rate in Country 2 induces
relatively wealthier agents to borrow rather than lend which increases the demand for borrowing
in Country 2 and leads the world bond market to clear. Hence, the relative size of Country 1
and Country 2 can have a signi¯cant impact on the world risk-free real interest rate as should be
expected.
Table 5 presents welfare comparisons of the open-economy and closed-economy models for both
Country 1 and Country 2. In both cases, welfare is higher in the open-economy equilibrium than in
the closed-economy equilibrium. Thus, the increase in steady-state aggregate consumption appears
to imply a social welfare gain. In Country 1, the welfare gain is predominantly among lenders and
25Table 4: Results
Country 1
Model Y C K B KF i ROE
Open Economy 2:0527 1:4025 5:8389 1:4935 0:0835 2:33% 3:02%
Closed Economy 2:0417 1:3999 5:7590 1:5494 0 2:50% 3:05%
Closed Economy Autarky 1:9987 1:3748 5:58 3:72%
Country 2
Model Y C K B KI i ROE
Open Economy 2:0507 1:3774 5:9101 0:6668 ¡0:0827 2:33% 2:86%
Closed Economy 1:8857 1:3372 4:8554 1:3532 0 3:60% 4:43%
Closed Economy Autarky 1:861 1:3537 4:67 5:07%
Open Economy refers to the collateral model with free capital °ows; Closed Economy refers to the
collateral model with no international capital °ows; Closed Economy Autarky refers to the case with no
collateral trades and no international °ows; Y refers to aggregate equilibrium output; C refers to aggregate
equilibrium consumption; K is aggregate equilibrium capital stock; B is the face-value of all bonds traded;
KF is the capital in°ow (in°ow if negative); i is the interest rate on the risk free bond; and ROE refers to
the average expected return to capital;
unconstrained borrowers who bene¯t from the greater consumption smoothing which international
lending provides. However, there is a slight increase in the measure of agents who are borrowing
constrained which is costly in terms of social welfare. The indices of inequality suggest also that
there is a modest decrease in inequality in Country 1 in the open-economy equilibrium. In addition,
relative to the results in Example 1, the levels of inequality in Country 1 appear to decrease more.
The reason is simply that the lower risk-free real interest rate increases the wealth of borrowers
slightly, which reduces inequality.
Again, it is in Country 2 that the welfare gains appear more pronounced although not quite as
large as in Example 1. The welfare gains from international intermediation also appear to roughly
halve the welfare costs associated with incomplete markets. In particular, the welfare gains to
international capital markets are equivalent, similar to the results in Example 1, with approximately
a 2.5 per cent increase in steady-state consumption. The welfare gains are associated, also, with
a roughly 40 percent decrease in the measure of borrowing constrained agents, which suggests
that international capital in°ows can have tangible distributional consequences. Once more, the
indices of inequality substantiate this point strongly, as both the Gini and the Generalised Entropy
measures show sharp reductions in inequality. Thus, the presence of incomplete markets with
collateral constraints appears to dramatically increase the welfare gains to international capital
26markets relative to the complete markets regardless of the size of each country.
Table 5: Welfare Comparisons
Country 1
Model Social Welfare CV Gini GE Top 30 Constrained
Open Economy 5:66 0:069 0:3836 0:1069 56:50 18:77
Closed Economy 6:03 0:0731 0:4054 0:1190 57:44 18:27
Country 2
Model Social Welfare CV Gini GE Top 30 Constrained
Open Economy 2:86 0:0375 0:2058 0:0308 43:94 6:34
Closed Economy 5:71 0:0731 0:3953 0:1100 59:28 10:00
Open Economy refers to the open-economy collateral model; Closed Economy refers to the closed-economy collateral model;
Social Welfare refers to the di®erence between either model and a closed-economy complete market model (i.e. a Social Planner)
where the number presented is the welfare cost is expressed as a percentage of the social welfare in the closed-economy complete
market model; CV is the per-capita lump-sum transfer of consumption required to attain the social welfare of the closed-economy
complete market model; Gini refers to the Gini coe±cient on the distribution of wealth, where wealth is de¯ned as the sum of capital
and bonds held by an agent; GE refers to the Generalised Entropy Measure on wealth using a weighting parameter of 0; Top 30
refers to the percentage of wealth held by the top 30 percent of agents; and Constrained refers to the percentage of agents who face
a binding borrowing constraint.
11 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the e®ects of international lending and borrowing when domestic credit
markets are incomplete. One implication of incomplete domestic credit markets is that a second-
best result emerges. That is, a tax on capital in°ows combined with a lump-sum transfer can be
welfare-improving for a government to impose when some agents are borrowing constrained. The
intuition is simply that constrained agents bene¯t from the transfer but do not su®er as a result of
the tax.
A second ¯nding from this paper is that international lending can have substantial implications
for social welfare when domestic markets are incomplete. Speci¯cally, if borrowers face collateral
constraints on borrowing then, depending on the properties of the idiosyncratic shock, the aggregate
social welfare gains can be in the neighborhood of 2.5 per cent of social welfare. Thus, the welfare
gains to international lending may be much higher than previous complete market estimates have
suggested.
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Figure 1: Example 1: Distribution of Wealth, Country 1




























Figure 2: Example 1: Distribution of Wealth, Country 2
































Figure 3: Example 2: Distribution of Wealth, Country 1




























Figure 4: Example 2: Distribution of Wealth, Country 2
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